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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to decide if the district erred in granting 
Philip Meyers' petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254. The district court concluded that Meyers' 
trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance when they 
gave Meyers incorrect advice as to his parole eligibility; that 
Meyers relied on that advice to his prejudice; and he was 
therefore entitled to habeas relief. For the reasons that 




On July 13, 1981, Philip Meyers killed Hugh Daily by 
striking him several times with a baseball bat. Meyers was 
subsequently charged with criminal homicide (first and 
second degree murder) and robbery. The robbery charge 
was dismissed following a preliminary hearing. Meyers was 
represented by two attorneys from the Bucks County Public 
Defender's Office. On October 21, 1981, following 
discussions with defense counsel, the Commonwealth 
withdrew the first degree murder charge and Meyers 
entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder in the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. At that time, 
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Pennsylvania imposed a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a 
conviction of second degree murder. Therefore, a defendant 
convicted of second degree murder could only be paroled if 
the governor, upon recommendation of the Board of 
Pardons, first commuted the life sentence to a term of 
imprisonment for a period of years. See Pa. CONST. art. 4, 
S 9. Dick Thornburgh was governor at the time of Meyers' 
plea, and he had a history of not commuting life sentences. 
After a sentencing hearing on November 9, 1981, Meyers 
was sentenced to the required period of life imprisonment. 
 
On November 30, 1981, Meyers filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea nunc pro tunc and for appointment of 
new counsel. However, the sentencing court did not act on 
that motion for nearly seven years, and Meyers eventually 
filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post 
Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. S 9541 et 
seq. ("PCHA"). The PCHA petition challenged the 
effectiveness of Meyers' trial counsel and the validity of his 
guilty plea. 
 
The Court of Common Pleas conducted evidentiary 
hearings on the PCHA petition on May 26, 1989, and 
December 19, 1989. At the hearings, Meyers testified that 
his trial counsel had advised him that if he pled guilty to 
second degree murder he would get life imprisonment but 
would be "eligible for parole in seven years." App. at 32. He 
also testified that he had no idea that the plea subjected 
him to a mandatory life sentence without parole eligibility. 
Id. at 40. Meyers' testimony was corroborated by one of his 
trial attorneys. She testified: 
 
       I think [Meyers] clearly misunderstood discussions that 
       we had concerning the amount of time that he was 
       going to do. We did have discussions with him 
       concerning the amount of time that we expected that 
       he would do. And quite frankly we based that on our 
       knowledge, at the time, of the amount of years that 
       people were serving in a state institution on homicide 
       cases, be they first degree or second degree prior to the 
       time. The sentences were being commuted at that time 
       by the Governor at the time. That's why I remember 
       the statistics showed that people who were 
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       incarcerated on second degree murder were being 
       paroled several years prior to the time or sentences 
       being commuted. 
 
Id. at 47. 
 
On August 8, 1991, the Court of Common Pleas 
dismissed Meyers' petition for post-conviction relief. The 
state court ruled that Meyers' plea was valid. The judge 
found Meyers' testimony "not to be credible, to the extent 
that he indicated that he was not fully and completely 
advised of the requisite constitutional and statutory rights 
in his 1981 guilty plea colloquy." App. at 105. The court 
also found that Meyers received effective assistance of 
counsel because "the advice counsel gave defendant 
regarding real time he would be incarcerated was accurate 
at the time it was given." Id. at 111. Accordingly, the court 
did not make specific findings concerning whether Meyers 
would have pled guilty had his trial attorneys specifically 
informed him that his plea required that he be sentenced to 
life in prison without parole. On October 29, 1993, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied 
allocatur. 
 
On November 28, 1994, Meyers filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in federal district 
court. He raised the same basic claims he had presented at 
the PCHA hearings in state court. The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on July 17, 1994. During that hearing, 
Meyers testified that his trial attorneys had advised him 
that they had reviewed a report which showed that Milton 
Shapp (who had been governor of Pennsylvania prior to 
Dick Thornburgh) had commuted the sentences of people 
convicted of second degree murder. App. at 134. However, 
Shapp was not governor when counsel was advising Meyers 
on how to proceed. Meyers further testified that he did not 
recall his attorneys ever using the term "commutation" 
during their discussions. Id. at 136. He stated "if I had 
known I was never eligible for parole, I would not have 
plead [sic] guilty." Id. at 146. 
 
By order dated September 6, 1995, the district court 
granted habeas relief. However, the court did not rely upon 
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Meyers' claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Rather, the court sustained Meyers' attack on the guilty 
plea colloquy. The court ruled that the colloquy was invalid 
under Pennsylvania law because the factual basis for the 
plea was not established until after the plea had been 
accepted. The Commonwealth appealed from that order, 
and we reversed. Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147 (3d Cir. 
1996). We held that the record fairly supported the state 
court's finding that a factual basis had been established 
prior to entry of the guilty plea. Id. at 1150. Moreover, we 
noted that establishing a factual basis for a guilty plea is 
not a condition precedent to acceptance of the plea, and the 
initial failure to establish the factual basis did not amount 
to a due process violation. Id. at 1151. Since the district 
court had not addressed Meyers' claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we remanded the case so the court 
could address that issue. 
 
On remand, the district court again granted Meyers' 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This time, the court 
focused on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The court found that Meyers had been told that he would 
be eligible for parole despite pleading guilty to second 
degree murder, that the advice was grossly misleading, and 
but for this misleading advice, there was a reasonable 
probability that Meyers would have pled not guilty and gone 
to trial. D. Ct. Op. at 46. Accordingly, the court held that 
Meyers was entitled to relief under Strickland1 and its 




A criminal defendant is entitled to reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
However, a defendant is only entitled to habeas relief for a 
violation of that right if he or she establishes ineffectiveness 
as well as resultant prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
This applies to representation during the plea process as 
well as representation during a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 58 (1985); see also, Bivens v. Groose, 28 F.3d 62, 
63 (8th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, several other courts have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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held that a defendant may be entitled to habeas relief if 
counsel provides parole eligibility information that proves to 
be grossly erroneous and defendant can show that he 
would not have plead guilty in the absence of the erroneous 
information. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 
885 (6th Cir. 1988); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 n. 6 
(5th Cir. 1987): O'Tuel v. Osborne, 706 F.2d 498, 500-01 
(4th Cir. 1983); Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st 
Cir. 1983); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 
1979). 
 
A. Deficient Performance 
 
Meyers' representation will not be deemed ineffective 
unless it "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Here, the 
state court found that the advice given to Meyers was 
accurate and concluded that trial counsels' representation 
was therefore not deficient. App. at 111.2 The district court 
disagreed and concluded that trial counsels' advice was 
"grossly misleading." Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, a federal 
court ordinarily must presume that state court findings of 
fact are correct. See Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145, 147 
(3d Cir. 1997). However, this presumption of correctness 
does not apply if the state court's findings are not fairly 
supported by the record. Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 
864 (3d Cir. 1994). The district court found that the record 
did not support the state court's conclusion that the 
"advice counsel gave defendant regarding the possible real 
time he would be incarcerated was accurate at the time it 
was given." D. Ct. Op. at 40. We agree. The state court's 
finding is clearly inconsistent with this record. 
 
The record is replete with instances where Meyers was 
informed that he would become eligible for parole sometime 
in the future despite pleading guilty to a crime that carried 
a mandatory period of life imprisonment as the only 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We noted in our first Meyers opinion that a defendant does not have 
a constitutional right to be provided with parole eligibility information 
prior to entering a plea. Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d at 1153 (citations 
omitted). However, we also noted that any information that is provided 
by defense counsel must be accurate. Id. 
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authorized sentence. Such statements were even made 
during the sentencing hearing in the presence of the judge 
and prosecutor, and neither made any effort to clarify 
Meyers' ineligibility for parole. At sentencing, the lead 
defense counsel told the court of individuals who would 
write to the Parole Board on Meyers' behalf and vocational 
opportunities which might exist for him "when he gets back 
on the street," as the trial court and prosecutor listened in 
silence. App. at 12-13 (emphasis added). Apparently, 
defense counsel mistakenly believed that their client would 
be eligible for parole. 
 
Co-counsel also used the term "parole" and implied that 
Meyers could serve less than life in prison when she later 
testified at the PCHA hearing and explained why she felt 
pleading to second degree murder was appropriate 
 
       I believe at the time, taking all factors into 
       consideration that it was the best resolution. And was 
       probably at some point going to result in Mr. Meyers 
       being paroled in a shorter period of time then he would 
       have been had he been found guilty of first degree and 
       received the death penalty . . . . 
 
App. at 55-56. She further acknowledged that Meyers 
misunderstood their discussions concerning parole 
eligibility. App. at 47. 
 
Even the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the 
matter was confused by trial counsels' insistence on a plea 
to second degree, as opposed to first degree, murder. He 
testified before the district court in opposition to Meyers' 
habeas petition that he did not understand defense 
counsels' position because first and second degree murder 
both carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole. The prosecutor described his conversation 
with the public defenders as follows: 
 
       I wanted a plea to first degree murder and did not 
       understand the distinction they were drawing between 
       first and second degree murder. They both carried life 
       sentences. 
 
       Our initial offer is we would not seek the death penalty, 
       agreed to a life sentence if he plead guilty tofirst 
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       degree murder. [Counsel] was insisting on second 
       degree murder. I do not see the distinction. 
 
       They mentioned regarding commutation of sentences or 
       the possibility of Mr. Meyers being released at some 
       point in the future and that would increase with the 
       second degree plea. 
 
App. at 151-52. Despite this casual reference to 
"commutation," it is clear that the procedural prerequisite 
of "commutation" was never explained to Meyers, and that 
Meyers did not realize he was, in all reality, pleading guilty 
to an offense that did not allow him to receive parole in the 
future. 
 
Moreover, even if defense counsel had explained that 
Meyers' parole eligibility was contingent upon having his 
life sentence commuted, defense counsels' reliance on an 
ambiguous report regarding parole eligibility would still 
have hopelessly confused the situation. That report appears 
to have tracked the number of individuals convicted of 
second degree murder who were paroled or who received 
commutations under Governor Shapp. The report is 
misleading at best. As noted above, Shapp was not the 
governor in 1981 when Meyers entered his guilty plea, and 
there was no way to predict whether then Governor 
Thornburgh would commute life sentences. Moreover, this 
report may have included individuals convicted of second 
degree murder before 1974 when second degree murder 
was punishable by imprisonment for a term of years and 
parole was possible.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Prior to 1974, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code only contained murder 
in the first degree and murder in the second degree. First degree murder 
included not only premeditated, intentional killing, but the concept of 
"felony-murder" as well. Second degree murder included all murders 
other than first degree murder. 18 Pa.C.S.A. S 2502 (Historical Note). The 
General Assembly amended the Crimes Code in 1974 and redefined 
second degree murder. Under the new Code that was in effect when 
Meyers pled guilty, second degree murder was limited to the codification 
of the "felony-murder rule." One commits second degree murder under 
the revised Crimes Code when a death occurs "while defendant was 
engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony," 
18 Pa.C.S. S 2502(b). 
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In any event, we are satisfied that the state court's 
finding regarding the accuracy of the advice Meyers 
received is not supported by this record. On the other 
hand, the contrary finding of the district court is consistent 
with this record, and we therefore conclude that the district 
court did not err in ruling that defense counsels' 
stewardship fell below that required by the Sixth 
Amendment. Accordingly, we turn to the second prong of 




The Commonwealth argues that, even if Meyers has 
established counsels' ineffectiveness, he cannot 
demonstrate prejudice because he has not shown that he 
would not have pled guilty but for the advice. The 
Commonwealth also argues that Meyers' plea spared him 
from a possible conviction for first degree murder that 
could have resulted in his execution. 
 
To succeed in showing prejudice, Meyers must show that 
it is reasonably probable that, but for the erroneous advice 
of his trial counsel, he would have pled not guilty and gone 
to trial. James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662 (5th Cir. 1995)(citing 
Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 (5th Cir. 1987)). "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. 
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992)(quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694). It is difficult for any court to determine in 
hindsight whether a criminal defendant would have pled 
guilty had he received competent advice from counsel. 
However, that difficulty cannot restrict our analysis nor 
cause us to deny relief that is otherwise appropriate and 
required under the law. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. Our task 
is further complicated by a delay of over sixteen years since 
the entry of the plea.4 However, given the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that Meyers has met his 
burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsels' erroneous advice, he would not have 
pled guilty, and that he has been prejudiced by doing so. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note, however, that the petitioner is not responsible for this 
delay. 
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As noted above, Meyers testified before the district court 
that he would not have pled guilty had he known he would 
not be eligible for parole. Meyers testified that"[i]f I had 
known I was never eligible for parole, I would not have 
plead [sic] guilty." App. at 146. The district court found that 
testimony to be credible, and we will not set aside that 
court's fact findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Monachelli v. Warden, SCI Graterford, 884 F.2d 749, 750 
(3d Cir. 1989). Meyers' testimony in state court is 
consistent with the federal court testimony.5 App. at 32, 40 
& 101. 
 
Moreover, the record contains other evidence that is 
consistent with Meyers' arguably self serving testimony. 
Meyers consistently asserted that the murder was not 
premeditated but a response to the victim grabbing him. 
App. at 31. During his confession on July 15, 1981, he 
stated that 
 
       The [victim] picked me up hitch-hiking. . . . We went to 
       to [sic] the bar, had a few drinks. He dropped me off 
       back at my tent. When I went back to my tent he 
       followed me back there and, I don't know how to 
       phrase it, you could say he assaulted me. He -- I don't 
       know how you want to say it, but he came up to me 
       from behind and startled me, for sure, and tried to 
       molest me. And I grabbed the baseball bat and hit him. 
 
App. at 205-06. We, of course, have no way of knowing if 
a fact finder would have accepted this testimony. However, 
this assertion is relevant to the Commonwealth's insistence 
that Meyer was not prejudiced because he avoided exposure 
to the death penalty. Based on this account, it is certainly 
a realistic possibility that defense counsel could have raised 
a reasonable doubt as to Meyers' specific intent to kill and 
thereby avoided a conviction for first degree murder. See 18 
Pa.C.S. S 2502(a). As a result, Meyers' offense could have 
been reduced to third degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. S 2502(c), 
with a maximum penalty of not more than 20 years 
imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S. S 1103(1)(1983). Furthermore, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because the state court ruled that Meyers did not satisfy the first 
Strickland prong, the court did not make a credibility determination as 
to this testimony. 
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there is evidence that Meyers, who had a long history of 
substance abuse, was under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs at the time of the murder. Under 
Pennsylvania law, evidence of "diminished capacity" could 
also reduce Meyers' crime to third degree murder. See 
Commonwealth v. Hathaway, 347 Pa. Super. 134, 146, 500 
A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. Super. 1985) ("The diminished capacity 
defense assumes the defendant is sane but lacks the ability 
to form a specific intent to kill, and thus reduces the 
charge of first degree murder to third degree murder."). 
 
The evidence that Meyers killed the victim only after 
being assaulted by him also introduces an element of self 
defense and such mitigation as could have reduced the 
killing to voluntary manslaughter, a second degree felony. 
18 Pa.C.S. S 2503. Under Pennsylvania law, a person 
commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing 
"he believes the circumstances to be such, that, if they 
existed, would justify the killing . . . , but his belief is 
unreasonable," 18 Pa.C.S. S 2503(b), or"he is acting under 
a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious 
provocation . . . ." 18 Pa.C.S. S 2503(a). The maximum 
sentence Meyers could have received for a conviction for 
voluntary manslaughter was 10 years imprisonment. 18 
Pa.C.S. S 1103(2)(1983). Meyers was also only eighteen 
years old at the time of the offense, and he did not have a 
history of violent crime. Thus, Meyers' exposure to the 
death penalty is less than a certainty. 
 
In contrast, the Commonwealth argues that part of its 
case against Meyers included a statement by a friend of 
Meyers who stated that Meyers told him he intended to rob 
the victim. Accordingly, the Commonwealth claims that this 
was a case where the felony-murder rule appropriately 
applied. Thus, argues the Commonwealth, Meyers was 
realistically facing no less than second degree murder 
anyway and was, therefore, not prejudiced by his plea. 18 
Pa.C.S. S 2502(b). However, the charge of robbery did not 
survive the preliminary hearing. We cannot determine if 
Meyers' friend would have testified for the Commonwealth 
or whether his testimony was credible. At oral argument, 
defense counsel asserted, without contradiction, that this 
witness has never testified under oath nor been found 
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credible by a fact finder. Therefore, that testimony is not 
part of the record in this appeal, and we cannot go beyond 
the record to refute Meyers' assertion of prejudice. 
 
In addition, this record does not establish that Meyers 
was motivated to plead guilty to avoid exposure to the 
death penalty. One of his trial attorneys did testify that she 
was concerned about that exposure, app. at 55 & 172, but 
Meyers testified that he was concerned with the impact of 
a trial on his family, and he was influenced by the 
likelihood of parole in the future. Id. at 146. Although the 
impact of a trial on his family supports the 
Commonwealth's theory that Meyers would have plead 
guilty anyway, the totality of Meyers' testimony undermines 
that position and leads us to affirm the contraryfinding of 
the district court. Cf. Czere, 883 F.2d at 64 (finding 
petitioner was not prejudiced by improper advice from 
counsel as to parole eligibility because petitioner's 





Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 
Meyers was prejudiced by the erroneous advice his trial 
counsel gave him. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
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